2023年12月28日上午，现代供应链管理研究院第95期学术论坛在明哲楼504如期举行。主讲人杨金鑫，现为浙江大学管理学院博士。她的研究主要聚焦于农产品供应链质量控制和质量提升。她的研究方法主要为理论模型与实证研究。本次报告题目为“Adulteration in Traceable Supply Chains under Government Inspections: Side-Effect and Competition from Non-Traceable Supply Chains”

杨金鑫博士就她的研究成果向在场的参会人员进行了细致而又精彩的汇报分享。到会的师生也就此展开探讨与交流，现场气氛热烈，发言踊跃，讨论深入。本次学术论坛的召开为相关领域的师生提供学术交流的平台，激发学院学者的科研热情，提升创新能力，丰富学术视野，让大家在宽松、和谐、求新的氛围中感受学术的魅力。未来，我院会继续加强高质量科研交流平台建设，促进领域内学者间的交流讨论，从而推动相关研究的发展，并为学校的双一流建设贡献力量。

【摘要】

To deter economically motivated adulteration (EMA) in farming supply chains, government agencies worldwide inspect products sold in markets and penalize non-compliant entities. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical model to assess the effectiveness of government inspections in deterring EMA in a market containing both traceable and non-traceable supply chains. Traceability aids the inspection agency in precisely identifying the provenance of sampled products, thereby targeting the farm to impose penalty if adulteration detected. We first examine the mechanisms of direct and indirect penalty by which governments deter EMA in the traceable and non-traceable supply chains, respectively. Then we fully characterize the adulteration behaviors of the farms in response to government penalties. Our analysis indicates that higher government penalties may inadvertently induce the traceable farm to adulterate. This is driven by the traceable farm’s desire to gain a more favorable competitive position and to circumvent the side-effect of indirect penalties. We also perform a preliminary empirical analysis by utilizing a sampling test dataset of China’s domestic agricultural market. Under specific market conditions, we observe a positive correlation between government inspection frequency and adulteration rate of the traceable farms, which aligns with our analytical results. 

【报告人简介】

杨金鑫为浙江大学管理学院博士生。在此之前，她拿到了东北大学的管理学学士学位。她的研究主要聚焦于农产品供应链质量控制和质量提升，主要研究成果正在审稿阶段。她的研究方法主要为理论模型与实证研究。

撰稿人：王戈

审核人：张颖