报告题目：Two-Sided Platform Competition with Client Recognition

报 告 人：缪元兵

报告时间：2026年9月16日（星期三），9:30-11:00

报告地点：明哲楼517

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

缪元兵，博士毕业于天津大学经管学部，现任香港理工大学商学院研究助理。研究聚焦数字平台领域，围绕动态定价机制、平台用户关系管理展开理论与实证研究，相关成果论文已获得Marketing Science小修（Minor Revision）评审意见。 

【摘要】

In recent years, client recognition (CR) has been increasingly prevalent in two-sided platform markets as a means to differentiate prices between repeat and new clients. Unlike traditional one-sided markets, two-sided markets feature cross-side network effects that interconnect actions of the two sides. This paper develops a two-period duopoly model to examine how CR changes when accounting for such two-sided interdependence. In one-sided markets, when clients are myopic, the first-period pricing decisions with CR are independent of those in the second period, even if firms are forward-looking. However, in two-sided markets, the first-period price competition on the CR side will be softened or reinforced because of the platforms' forward-looking behavior. The specific impact depends on the asymmetry of cross-side network effects generated by the two sides. Moreover, in the presence of cross-side network effects, platforms have an incentive to reduce prices on one side to make the other side more attractive. When clients are also forward-looking, CR introduces a unique effect in two-sided markets: Its adoption strengthens the price-reducing incentive enticed by the first-period cross-side network effects when applied on both sides. Interestingly, there is no such effect when it is applied on only one side. Based on these novel impacts, we establish the conditions under which the adoption of CR either hampers or enhances platform profitability and show that some classical results in one-sided markets are modified. Overall, this study advances our understanding of the unique interaction between CR and cross-side network effects in two-sided markets.