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ISCA明哲论坛:NO. 148 Innovative Product Sourcing: Linking Design and Production
2026年10月28日

报告题目:Innovative Product Sourcing: Linking Design and Production

报 告 人:梁俊

报告时间:2026年10月28日(星期三)10:00-11:30

报告地点:明哲楼517

主办单位:东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

 

【报告人简介】

梁俊,博士毕业于香港科技大学工业工程与决策科学系。其研究聚焦于供应链管理与平台经济领域,运用博弈论方法开展相关研究。曾获 POMS China 最佳论文一等奖与三等奖,两篇获奖论文目前均在 Management Science 返修中。

 

【摘要】

We consider a buyer that sources the design and production of an innovative product from two competing suppliers. Each supplier improves its design with innovation effort and can produce another supplier’s design, albeit at a switching cost. The link between design value and production allocation provides an incentive for supplier innovation, and the buyer can strengthen this linkage ex ante by committing along two dimensions: (i) a production guarantee to the designer and (ii) selecting the designer based solely on design value. Different combinations of these commitments yield four mechanisms with practical implementations. We show that the no-commitment mechanism, which maximizes ex post allocation efficiency, reduces to a choice between joint sourcing (a single supplier for design and production) and separate sourcing (best-design selection with separate production sourcing) after designs are observed. Committing to either rule ex ante increases supplier effort; combining both in an enhanced commitment increases effort further. Yet, commitment also lowers allocation efficiency. In terms of buyer profit, separate sourcing is dominated by other mechanisms. Enhanced commitment is optimal when innovation is inexpensive. Otherwise, joint sourcing is optimal except under a low switching cost, where no commitment is preferred. If partial production guarantees are allowed, they emerge under high innovation cost and moderate switching cost. An additional innovation prize complements enhanced commitment when innovation is inexpensive, without altering mechanism rankings. Together, these results identify a sequence of incentive instruments — production guarantee, best-design selection, and innovation prize — that buyers may deploy progressively when sourcing innovative products.


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