报告题目：Agency Selling and Retail Pass-Through

报 告 人：郑权

报告时间：2020年10月29日（周四），13：30-15：00

报告地点：明哲楼504（本报告同时进行线上直播）

主办单位：现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

郑权，美国佛罗里达大学博士，中国科学技术大学管理学院副教授。主要研究领域为零售和平台运营管理，行为学定价，供应链管理，运营管理和市场营销/信息系统交叉学科研究等。相关研究成果发表在Marketing Science, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management等运营管理和市场营销领域知名期刊。 

【摘要】

With the rapid growth of e-commerce, agency selling gains popularity among online retailers (e-tailers) nowadays, in which e-tailers allow suppliers direct access to their customers with a commission. Prior research implicitly abstracts away from the cross-brand pass-through and suggests that a shift from the traditional wholesale selling to agency selling benefits e-tailers but harms suppliers. As an important counterweight to this result, we discover that the e-tailer's choice of selling format is critically moderated by the retail pass-through behavior under wholesale selling as well as competition mode under agency selling. On one hand, agency selling can improve channel efficiency vis-a-vis wholesale selling. On the other hand, the relative intensity of supplier competition between two selling formats is ambiguous. We show that the extant result only holds for a non-negative cross-brand pass-through rate (e.g., linear demands); otherwise (e.g., multiplicative and exponential demands), the opposite can be true. Interestingly, the preference over the selling format can be aligned between the e-tailer and suppliers. Moreover, we find that the e-tailer is more likely to adopt wholesale selling under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Finally, under agency selling with endogenous commission fee, we caution against the seemingly innocuous normalization of production cost. Our findings not only shed light on the theory of agency selling, but also provide a plausible explanation for the observation that wholesale selling continues to prevail in online markets.