报告题目：Fit-revelation Strategy and Advertising: Complements or Substitutes?
报 告 人：邓世名
邓世名，男，北京大学物理、计算机双学士。加州大学伯克立分校工业工程和运筹学博士。华中科技大学管理学院教授、博士生导师。湖北省政协委员。美国斯坦福大学访问学者、加州大学伯克利分校访问学者。曾任职于美国加州甲骨文公司（Oracle）总部。文章发表在 Operations Research、Management Science、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、EJOR、Omega、IJPE、IJPR、IEEE Trans.等一流 SCI/SSCI 国际学术期刊上。曾获评湖北省“楚天特聘”学者、湖北省“百人计划”、武汉东湖高新科技开发区 3551 人才支持计划、“华中”学者。承担多项国家自然科学基金项目，并曾为 Intel、FedEx 等世界 500 强企业等承担优化项目，取得良好效益。
Consumers are often uncertain about how a product fits their individual preferences. To alleviate consumers' concern, sampling (or other information provision activities such as trials and product demonstrations) can be offered to resolve their fit uncertainties before buying. We refer to sampling with such a focus as fit-revelation sampling. In practice, sampling is often offered jointly with advertising. Empirical research has shown sampling may enhance or weaken the effect of advertising. Based on these studies, we develop an analytical model to examine at strategic level whether fit-revelation sampling is complementary or substitute with persuasive and market expansion (ME) advertising, respectively, and characterize the firm's strategy space of whether to offer sampling alone, advertising alone, or both. We find that advertising may reverse the firm's decision on whether to offer sampling. Also, when sampling enhances the effect of advertising, these two instruments are not necessarily complementary. Moreover, complementarity does not guarantee the optimality of the joint strategy, whereas substitutability does not always exclude the optimality of offering advertising and sampling together. We further contrast persuasive and market expansion advertising, and show that the firm's strategic decision differs significantly depending on the nature of its ads. Our study provides firms guidelines on the optimal pricing, advertising and information provision strategy for markets characterized by consumer fit uncertainty.