报告题目：Adulteration in Traceable Supply Chains under Government Inspections: Side-Effect and Competition from Non-Traceable Supply Chains

报 告 人：杨金鑫

报告时间：2023年12月28日（星期四），10:00-11:30

报告地点：明哲楼504

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

杨金鑫是浙江大学管理学院博士生。在此之前，她拿到了东北大学的管理学学士学位。她的研究主要聚焦于农产品供应链质量控制和质量提升，主要研究成果正在审稿阶段。她的研究方法主要为理论模型与实证研究。

【摘要】

To deter economically motivated adulteration (EMA) in farming supply chains, government agencies worldwide inspect products sold in markets and penalize non-compliant entities. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical model to assess the effectiveness of government inspections in deterring EMA in a market containing both traceable and non-traceable supply chains. Traceability aids the inspection agency in precisely identifying the provenance of sampled products, thereby targeting the farm to impose penalty if adulteration detected. We first examine the mechanisms of direct and indirect penalty by which governments deter EMA in the traceable and non-traceable supply chains, respectively. Then we fully characterize the adulteration behaviors of the farms in response to government penalties. Our analysis indicates that higher government penalties may inadvertently induce the traceable farm to adulterate. This is driven by the traceable farm’s desire to gain a more favorable competitive position and to circumvent the side-effect of indirect penalties. We also perform a preliminary empirical analysis by utilizing a sampling test dataset of China’s domestic agricultural market. Under specific market conditions, we observe a positive correlation between government inspection frequency and adulteration rate of the traceable farms, which aligns with our analytical results.