报告题目：Too Good to Go: Combating Food Waste with Surprise Clearance

报 告 人：于漫

报告时间：2024年06月12日（星期三），10:00-11:30

报告地点：笃行楼712会议室

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

于漫，香港科技大学商学院信息系统、商业统计与运营管理系教授。她于密歇根大学罗斯商学院获得商业管理博士学位，在清华大学经济管理学院获得管理科学学士和硕士学位。她的主要研究兴趣包括通过消费者行为建模进行定价和收益管理、运营和营销的交互以及供应链管理。她目前担任Production and Operations Management杂志高级编辑以及Decision Sciences杂志的副主编。

【摘要】

This paper studies surprise clearance as an innovative business model to increase store profit and reduce food waste. A store holding surprise clearance sells “surprise bags” composed of surplus food that would otherwise become waste. At the time of ordering, consumers are uncertain about the quantity of food items included in a surprise bag. We model surprise clearance and compare it with both no clearance and transparent clearance, which sets a transparent unit clearance price based on the amount of surplus food after regular sales. We find that surprise clearance achieves the highest store profit and induces the most store production among the three selling schemes. While both clearance schemes have the ability to eliminate store waste, the store effectively does so under surprise clearance but deliberately does not under transparent clearance. In fact, transparent clearance may generate even more store waste than no clearance. Further, both clearance schemes exacerbate the problem of consumer waste compared to no clearance, and despite zero store waste, surprise clearance generates the most consumer waste among the three schemes. If clearance sales target a consumer segment with a sufficiently low valuation of consumption, both clearance schemes reduce total food waste and surprise clearance represents a win-win solution that maximizes store profit and minimizes total waste among the three schemes. However, there are circumstances under which both clearance schemes fail to reduce total waste, and surprise clearance may end up with the most total waste among the three schemes.