报告题目：Joint Signaling via Warranty and Price under Competition

报 告 人：张琪

报告时间：2024年10月25日（星期五），10:00-11:30

报告地点：笃行楼712会议室

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】 

张琪，西安交通大学管理科学与工程专业博士，曾获国家留学基金委（CSC）资助Santa Clara University联合培养。2022年12月进入东北财经大学博士后流动站。主要研究方向包括供应链管理、供应链金融、可持续供应链以及非对称信息博弈等。研究成果发表在Computers & Industrial Engineering、中国管理科学等期刊上，另有多篇文章处于Production and Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research、International Journal of Production Economics等期刊的修改阶段。主持教育部人文社科基金青年项目、辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目各一项。

【摘要】When product quality is unknown to consumers, a high-quality firm can signal its quality with a warranty, which entails lower repair costs for high-quality firms than for low-quality firms. This article constructs a theoretical model in which two competing firms may simultaneously send quality signals via warranties and prices. The authors find that a separating equilibrium always exists, and no pooling equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion. Additionally, signaling competition lengthens the warranty of a high-quality firm when it competes with a low-quality firm. However, signaling competition may shorten the warranty when it competes with another high-quality firm and the competition between them is not intense. This article then extends the signaling game to a duopoly market in which consumers are informed about the quality of one firm but are unaware of the quality of the other firm. The authors demonstrate that the high- quality firm provides a longer warranty when both firms’ qualities are unknown to consumers than when only its own quality is unknown. The hidden quality information of a low-quality firm benefits itself and harms its rival when the rival’s quality is high and also unknown to consumers.

撰稿：王   戈

初审：冯月昕

二审：刘   旭

三审：张   颖