2024年10月25日上午，现代供应链管理研究院第108期学术论坛在笃行楼712会议室如期举行。主讲人张琪，东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院博士后。她的主要研究方向包括供应链管理、供应链金融、可持续供应链以及非对称信息博弈等。报告题目为“Joint Signaling via Warranty and Price under Competition”。

论坛上，张琪就她的研究成果，向在场的参会人员进行了生动的汇报分享。参会者围绕报告主题与张琪博士后展开了热烈讨论，思想碰撞激烈。未来，我院将继续加强高质量科研交流平台的建设，为学者们提供更多的交流与合作机会，共同打开科研工作的新局面，助力学校工商管理一级学科建设并为学校的双一流建设注入新的活力。

【摘要】

 When product quality is unknown to consumers, a high-quality firm can signal its quality with a warranty, which entails lower repair costs for high-quality firms than for low-quality firms. This article constructs a theoretical model in which two competing firms may simultaneously send quality signals via warranties and prices. The authors find that a separating equilibrium always exists, and no pooling equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion. Additionally, signaling competition lengthens the warranty of a high-quality firm when it competes with a low-quality firm. However, signaling competition may shorten the warranty when it competes with another high-quality firm and the competition between them is not intense. This article then extends the signaling game to a duopoly market in which consumers are informed about the quality of one firm but are unaware of the quality of the other firm. The authors demonstrate that the high- quality firm provides a longer warranty when both firms’ qualities are unknown to consumers than when only its own quality is unknown. The hidden quality information of a low-quality firm benefits itself and harms its rival when the rival’s quality is high and also unknown to consumers.

【报告人简介】

张琪，西安交通大学管理科学与工程专业博士，曾获国家留学基金委（CSC）资助Santa Clara University联合培养。2022年12月进入东北财经大学博士后流动站。主要研究方向包括供应链管理、供应链金融、可持续供应链以及非对称信息博弈等。研究成果发表在Computers & Industrial Engineering、中国管理科学等期刊上，另有多篇文章处于Production and Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research、International Journal of Production Economics等期刊的修改阶段。主持教育部人文社科基金青年项目、辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目各一项。

撰稿：王   戈

初审：冯月昕

复审：刘   旭

终审：张   颖