报告题目：Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues

报 告 人：王姚磊

报告时间：2025年11月7日（星期五），10:00-11:30

报告地点：明哲楼517

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

王姚磊，中国科学技术大学管理学院特任副研究员。中国科学技术大学管理科学与工程博士。主要研究方向为服务运营管理、排队博弈、运作管理与市场营销交叉等。相关研究成果发表在Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics 等运营管理领域知名期刊。

【摘要】

We study advance selling and upgrading in a priority queue setting that emerges in the amusement park industry. Customers choose to buy fast-track or regular tickets depending on their heterogeneous waiting costs. We analyze a two-stage model in a queueing game framework. We investigate two pricing schemes, both with and without upgrading options, under different scenarios depending on the proportion of customers who have access to advance ticket purchasing. When all customers have access to advance ticket purchasing, our findings indicate that the advance-and-spot selling scheme yields the same maximum revenue as the scheme that includes the upgrading option if the spot regular ticket price is not too large; thus, the upgrading option becomes unnecessary. Otherwise, allowing upgrading generates more revenue (and social welfare). Interestingly, although upgrading options offer consumers greater flexibility, they reduce consumer surplus in scenarios where upgrading increases revenue. When some customers only purchase tickets on the spot, our numerical analysis shows that allowing upgrading results in higher revenue when the probability of high system congestion is large and highlights cases when the revenue gap is significant. Finally, we extend our analysis to account for customers’ balking behavior and the additional waiting time incurred when purchasing tickets on the spot, providing a robust check on scheme comparison.