报 告 人：关旭

报告时间：2025年12月15日（星期一），9:00-10:00

报告地点：明哲楼517

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

关旭，华中科技大学管理学院供应链管理与系统工程系主任。主要研究方向包括供应链管理、运营与市场结合、平台经济与信息设计，主持承担国家自然科学基金杰出青年基金项目、国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金项目、国际(地区)合作与交流项目（NFSC-RGC）研究项目等，研究成果发表在MS、MKS、 MSOM、 ISR以及POM等商学院权威期刊。同时担任Service Science期刊副主编和MS等国际权威期刊审稿专家。

【摘要】

Influencers play a crucial role in shaping consumers’ purchase decisions by evaluating and recommending products in exchange for sales commissions. However, misinformation about products, whether due to intentional deception or a lack of expertise to accurately evaluate products, can mislead consumers into purchasing low-value products. This paper investigates how regulations can mitigate misinformation through two mechanisms: penalizing influencers for misrecommendations and improving their expertise. We find that while higher penalties increase the cost burden on influencers and reduce their incentive to recommend a firm’s products, they can also increase consumers’ perceived value of the recommended product and ultimately benefit not only consumers but also the influencer and the firm. Surprisingly, although improving influencer expertise enhances the accuracy of product evaluations, it may also incentivize influencers to make deceptive recommendations more frequently, leaving the firm worse off when collaborating with more experienced influencers. From the consumers’ perspective, neither increasing the penalty for misrecommendation nor raising influencers’ expertise level alone necessarily safeguards them from misinformation and may even backfire. Our findings highlight the need for policymakers to adopt a joint regulatory approach that considers penalties and expertise requirements to curb misinformation in influencer marketing.