报告题目：Operational-Marketing Trade-offs in Managing Social and Environmental Responsibility

报 告 人：柴世伟

报告时间：2025年12月29日（星期一），10:00-11:30

报告地点：明哲楼517

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

柴世伟是佛罗里达大学沃灵顿商学院运营管理系的博士候选人。他的研究兴趣集中在运营管理中随机环境下的决策问题以及其背后的经济影响，并涉及多个应用场景：服务系统运营、生产调度管理、企业社会责任管理、金融科技与供应链管理等。柴世伟的研究成果已经在国际顶级期刊Operations Research, Production and Operations Management等发表。

【摘要】

This paper is motivated by observing the substantive interest in environmental stewardship by both regulators and individual firms. For regulators, key concerns relate to better management of public environmental risks by designing an incentive mechanism (comprising a fine and subsidy) for a firm to optimize social environmental welfare. The firm, on the other hand, maximizes its profit by choosing product prices, marketing (advertising) effort, and operational (audit/inspection or process improvement) effort expended to reduce environmental violations.

Through a rigorous analysis of a stochastic dynamic programming problem for a risk-neutral firm and a characterization of the corresponding fine and subsidy mechanism for the regulator, insights offered are as follows. While the fixed subsidy has no impact on the firm’s decisions, increases in both the fine and per-unit subsidy incentivize the firm to expend: (a) higher marketing effort through an increase in advertising expenditures; and (b) higher operational efforts directed at reducing the rate of environmental violations. Interestingly, we also find that when the fine is not too harsh, it is optimal for the regulator to set a positive per-unit subsidy for social welfare maximization.