报告题目：Responsible Sourcing Through Online “Supplier Intelligence” Platforms

报 告 人：李林秋

报告时间：2026年6月17日（星期三），14:00-15:30

报告地点：明哲楼517

主办单位：东北财经大学现代供应链管理研究院

【报告人简介】

李林秋，中国科学技术大学管理学院特任副教授。2021年获中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院运筹学博士学位。主要研究兴趣为平台运营管理、可持续运营管理、机制设计等。她的研究工作发表在Manufacturing and Service Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research、Naval Research Logistics等期刊，主持及参与3项国家自然科学基金项目。

【摘要】

To ease buyers’ burden in seeking responsible suppliers, some online “supplier intelligence” platforms now offer supplier audit services. Given this alternative, should buyers rely on these platforms to facilitate responsible sourcing? To address this question, we develop a game-theoretical model involving a buyer and two potential suppliers whose social-responsibility compliance is not completely known to either party. The buyer would incur a penalty when sourcing from a low-compliance supplier. We compare two sourcing scenarios: direct sourcing, where the buyer searches and audits the suppliers directly, and platform sourcing, where the buyer sources through a platform that acts as a marketplace and conducts supplier audits. By examining and comparing these two sourcing models, where the principal (buyer or platform) specifies the efficacy level of imperfect audits, our equilibrium outcomes generate the following results. First, the buyer increases its audit efficacy when the social-responsibility penalty increases under direct sourcing, whereas interestingly, the penalty has a non-monotonic impact on the platform's audit efficacy. Second, platform sourcing generally intensifies suppliers’ price competition. However, when the platform sets a higher audit efficacy or when the penalty is higher, supplier competition is softened, thereby raising wholesale prices. Third, platform sourcing is not always superior to direct sourcing: it promotes responsible sourcing effectively only when the penalty is low or when the pool of compliant suppliers is limited. Furthermore, when the penalty is moderate, platform sourcing can create a win-win outcome for both the buyer and suppliers, achieving a Pareto improvement over direct sourcing.